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 1. Introduction
Few forces have shaped, and continue to shape, the world as much as migration. Dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century, Western Europe transformed from being a prime
source of emigrants leaving for a better life in other continents to a lucrative destination.
Migration ﬂows improve overall eﬃciency and may generate vast eﬃciency gains, when based
on productivity diﬀerences. Simultaneously, migration also sets European systems of social
protection in jeopardy.1 More surprisingly, even migration based on productivity diﬀerences
may reduce eﬃciency in a dynamic setting as it reduces national incentives to ﬁnance inter-
nationally applicable education. There are three separate, but often interlinked, reasons for
this. First of all, the government has to invest in the education of the young before they
decide where to live, work, and pay taxes after graduation. The expected returns to the
government are lower the higher the probability that the student emigrates. Secondly, each
government faces a temptation to free-ride, especially concerning expensive science-based
ﬁelds of study. Instead of educating future professionals itself, the government may aim to
attract those educated elsewhere by cutting taxes. There are no similar disincentives in,
say, educating lawyers due to degrees in law being much more country-speciﬁc. Thirdly,
increased mobility of professionals increases the marginal cost of public funds collected from
them.
There are four alternatives to maintain the current level of public ﬁnancing of education
in the European Union.2 One is taxing immobile tax bases to ﬁnance the education of high-
1For an extensive overview on the economics of immigration, see Borjas (1994).
2There are several justiﬁcations for not relying only on private ﬁnancing or student loans. An obvious
2skilled professionals, whose tax burden would be eroded in international tax competition.
This would imply regressive redistribution, as shown by Wildasin (2000). The second alter-
native, the European centralization of decision-making of education, would lead to excessive
harmonization, and is ruled out by the subsidiarity principle. This paper suggests two new
alternatives. They are introducing graduate taxes or introducing income-contingent loans,
both paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile. In order to protect
citizens against Leviathan governments, such contracts should be voluntary, allowing stu-
dents to opt out. A drawback of voluntary graduate tax contracts or income-contingent loans
is that they would introduce an adverse selection problem: Students with highest expected
earnings would prefer to opt out. Limiting adverse selection problem requires a certain de-
gree of subsidization out of general tax revenue to maintain a suﬃcient attractiveness also
for those with relatively high expected income. Such subsidization could be viewed as a
social insurance premium paid to protect citizens against a possibility of expropriation by a
possible Leviathan government. This is part of a more general trade-oﬀ between balancing
the adverse selection problem as concerns participation in social insurance and the moral
hazard problem on the part of governments when participation is compulsory.
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have adopted income-contingent loan
one are external eﬀects when diﬀerent factors are complementary. These may arise either from production
technology or from corporatist labor market structures, provided that the educated would not reap their
full marginal productivity as their wage income. Public provision of education also implements risk-sharing
among students. García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) compare the eﬃciency and equity eﬀects of alternative
ways of ﬁnancing higher education. They argue that, with uncertainty, the graduate tax is a better solution
than student loans, student loans whose repayment is conditional on future revenue, or relying on general
tax revenue. In this paper, I do not compare private and public education, but focus on how migration
aﬀects higher education, in case it is publicly provided.
3schemes where maximum repayment is limited to loan and interest, whereas low-income
workers pay back less than the full loan. Such a system requires, however, general tax
revenue to subsidize low-income workers.3 Also Sweden had a system of income-contingent
loans, in eﬀect between 1989 and 2001. The repayment rate was four percent of total income
if living in Sweden and a yearly amount if living abroad. Loans taken after June 2001 are
ordinary annuity loans. (CSN 2002). Sweden abandoning its income-contingent loan system
may reﬂect the pressures of increased labor mobility. Unlike income-contingent loans, annuity
loans do not require cooperation from foreign tax authorities. Of all of those who graduate
from Swedish universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998). Due to wide income gaps,
migration ﬂows from the prospective new EU member states to the current states could
be both larger and more permanent. This raises a possibility of brain drain, discussed by
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). Accounting for brain drain would further strengthen the case
for graduate taxes as concerns public provision of education.4
Also Poutvaara (2000, 2001) suggests ﬁnancing income redistribution for students from
taxes collected from them, independently of their future domicile. There is only one type
of human capital, equally applicable everywhere, and ex ante identical students decide on
their own investment in education. This paper has a diﬀerent focus. Young people have
diﬀerent abilities, and there are several forms of human capital. Diﬀerent types of education
are allowed to have diﬀerent degrees of international applicability, and education is provided
3For an analysis of the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme, see Chapman (1997).
4On the other hand, Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002) highlight that higher returns to
skills available abroad increase private incentives to invest in those skills in developing countries.
4b yt h eg o v e r n m e n t .T h i si s ,i n d e e d ,t h ec a s ef o rt h em a j o r i t yo fy o u n gp e o p l ei nE u r o p e a n
countries. Governments are a major source of funding for universities, as well as aﬀect the
type of education provided. Indeed, the government may even choose the type of education
to limit mobility.5 Graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be used to ﬁnance
also other types than university education given to adults. In that case, tax rates could be
diﬀerentiated according to the type of education received. The focus is on education targeted
to young adults.6 Voluntary graduate tax contracts or income-contingent loans would solve
a problem of missing private market for income risks related to education, thereby improving
the working of the market mechanism rather than replacing it.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model of how the
government invests in education of its young citizens when the migrants pay their wage taxes
only to their residence country. This corresponds to the current European tax constitution.
Section 3 studies investment behavior in two alternative federal arrangements to curb tax
competition: graduate taxes and income-contingent loans. Both would be paid to the country
which has ﬁnanced education, thereby giving that country a stake in productivity increases
independently of future domicile of its students. It also presents a calculation of a graduate
tax for Finland. Section 4 discusses the trade-oﬀ between an adverse selection problem on
the part of citizens and moral hazard problem on the part of governments, the enlargement
5On the other hand, Kehoe (1989) argues that tax competition may oﬀer a way to avoid the time-
consistency problem. Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) suggest that labor
mobility could increase investment in education as it serves as a commitment device to low taxation.
6In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education may buy better education for their children
by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in higher education, as young adults may go to
a university in a diﬀerent city, or even country, than in which their parents pay taxes.
5of the European Union, as well as administrative issues and possible synergies in other
policy ﬁelds, most notably integrating pension systems and limiting tax evasion. Section 5
concludes.
2. Common Labor Market with Tax Competition
2.1. Game Structure
Without loss of generality, assume that there are two member states in a common labor
market, labeled 1 and 2. I analyze a symmetric federation in which production functions,
wage tax rates and costs of education are the same in both member states, commenting on
how results would change in a federation of asymmetric member states in section 4.2.
In the ﬁrst stage, national governments invest in the education they provide to their
citizens. There are two types of education, labeled i and s. These subscripts refer to
whether the education is internationally applicable (i)o rc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc( s). Only those
with internationally applicable education may migrate. In the second stage, they choose in
which member state they live and work. In the third stage, citizens supply labor and pay
taxes in the member state they live in. Government collects wage taxes from the educated to
ﬁnance exogenous public consumption and public education, and transfers the rest of the tax
revenue to the owners of the other factors of production, like pensioners and the uneducated.
In order to focus on the eﬀects of the mobility of labor on investment in education, rather
than the eﬀects of migration on tax rates through tax competition, I assume that the tax rate
of the educated is a constant t.7 Government budget constraint is then balanced by adjusting
7Keen and Marchand (1997) use the same assumption when they study the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition on
6transfers to the rest of the population. When education is publicly provided, students would
generally be better oﬀ accepting publicly provided education, even if this does not maximize
their gross income, than purchasing the other type of education themselves. From now on, I
assume that it is optimal for all students to accept publicly provided education rather than
buying a diﬀerent education themselves. Without loss of generality, I focus on analyzing
member state 1.
2.2. Production
The production function is linear in the two types of human capital. Both types of hu-
man capital may also generate positive externalities that cannot be appropriated by workers
themselves. For example, a larger stock of human capital would increase the marginal prod-
uct of complementary factors of production. In a corporatist labor market, these external
eﬀects may also capture the diﬀerence between the marginal product of the educated and
their wage rate. With labor unions aiming at compressing the wage distribution, an increase
in the marginal productivity of one worker need not be fully reﬂected in his or her wage rate.










in which w measures the coeﬃcient with which human capital of type i is able to generate
the composition of public expenditure in the presence of mobile capital. They ﬁnd that in a non-cooperative
equilibrium, public expenditures are biased towards the provision of public inputs at the expense local public
goods beneﬁting immobile residents.
7production apart from externalities, H1
k, k ∈ {i,s}, is the post-migration stock of eﬀective
human capital, and ek, k ∈ {i,s}, measures the coeﬃcient of external eﬀects generated by
human capital of type k,w i t hek ≥ 0. These external beneﬁts accumulate to other factors
of production, like land, ﬁxed capital and uneducated workers. The coeﬃcient of human
capital of type s is normalized to unity. These coeﬃcients give as the gross rates of return
to human capital of type s 1 and human capital of type iw .
Citizens diﬀer in their productivity in case they would complete education i, while they
have identical productivity in case they would complete education s. Human capital with
education i for a citizen with ability a is in his or her home country:
h(a,i)=a,
while human capital created by completing education of type s is normalized to unity for
all citizens. Eﬀective human capital of migrants is speciﬁed in the following section. The
resource cost of education k,k ∈ {i,s}, is ck. Ability a follows a continuous distribution
b e t w e e n0a n d1 ,w i t hd e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf(a).
I assume that the government is able to screen the students with highest ability to
participate in ability-intensive education i. I ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt od os o ,a sp r o d u c t i v i t y
with country-speciﬁc education does not depend on ability. I denote the cutoﬀ level of ability
chosen by government 1 by b a1, below which citizens are educated in the ﬁeld s and above
8w h i c hi nt h eﬁeld i. Thus, the stock of human capital s in member state 1 is
H
1
s = F(b a1),
and the pre-migration stock of human capital i is
R 1
b a1 f(a)ada.
Wage rates correspond to gross rates of return in the production function, apart from
externalities. Therefore, wage income of the educated with education s is 1, while the wage
income of an educated citizen with education i and ability a is aw in his or her home
country. The length of education may diﬀer across diﬀerent programs. After education has
been completed, individuals supply labor services inelastically for their remaining working
life. The government and individuals have access to international loan markets with a given
interest rate r. Wage income as well as costs are denoted in net present value terms using
the discount rate r. For both types of education to be proﬁtable from social perspective, I
assume that w + ei − ci > 1+es − cs. This guarantees that the government maximizing
production would educate a citizen with ability 1 in ﬁeld i. Citizen with a =0always
becomes educated in ﬁeld s.
2.3. Migration
As h a r eγ of internationally applicable education in one member state is applicable in
the other member state in case of migration, satisfying 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.I n o r d e r t o a c c o u n t
for a possibility of mutually beneﬁcial brain exchange, assume that each individual faces an
individual-speciﬁc random component related to productivity abroad, unknown to govern-
9ment before education but known to the individual before migration. The random component
takes a multiplicative form 1+ε,s ot h a tε is uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5.
In other words, some individuals would lose an individual-speciﬁc share of their productivity
in case they emigrate, while others would beneﬁt from a boost in their productivity abroad.
An individual with internationally applicable education would then emigrate to the other
member state if and only if
γ(1 + ε) > 1. (1)
(1) deﬁnes the cutoﬀ level of εi = 1
γ − 1, below which citizens with internationally
applicable education remain in their original member state. By symmetry, this cutoﬀ level
is the same in both member states. For simplicity, I assume that ε is not correlated with
individual ability a. By this assumption and the properties of uniform distribution, the share
of remaining internationally applicable human capital is given by F(εi).
W h e nt h e r ei ss o m em i g r a t i o n ,F(εi)=1
γ − 1
2 i st h es h a r eo ft h o s ew i t he d u c a t i o ni who








As long as γ>2
3, there is migration. The probability of migration reaches its peak of 0.5
when γ =1 . As migration occurs only when the productivity of migrants is higher in the
other member state, brain exchange increases the aggregate production. Thanks to mutually
beneﬁcial brain exchange, the average productivity of migrants with education i is b times
10what it would have been if they would have stayed in their member state of origin, in which








This average gain is the same for migrants from both member states. Post-migration
internationally applicable human capital in member state 1 consists of share (1 − p) of











Here b ak, k ∈ {1,2} is the endogenously determined cutoﬀ ability in member state k under
tax competition.
2.4. Public education
Government in each member state collects wage taxes at rate t from the educated to
ﬁnance exogenous public consumption G and public education, and returns the rest of the
tax revenue to the owners of the other factors of production, like the uneducated. The
transfer in member state 1 is T1. In order to capture distortions arising from taxation, a
share δ of potential tax revenue is lost.
8Remember that ε is uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5. The highest value of 1+ε is 3
2, while
the lowest value with migration is 1+ε1
i = 1
γi.







= G + csF(b a1)+ci(1 − F(b a1)) + T1. (3)
A central question when analyzing publicly provided education with migration is to
determine how each government appreciates the utility of those of its citizens who emigrate.9
I assume that the weight on those citizens is α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This formulation allows two
polar cases: with α =0each government cares only for its citizens who do not emigrate,
and with α =1the emigrants count with the same weight as citizens who stay. Utility of
all citizens is linear in their consumption. The social welfare function of the government of
member state 1 is
SWF
TC












The ﬁrst two terms give the after-tax income of the educated who stay, the third term is
the social valuation of the utility of the educated who emigrate, the fourth and the ﬁfth term
give external beneﬁts from education, and the sixth term is the lump-sum transfer for the rest
of the population. Solving for T1 from (3), the social welfare function can be presented solely
as a function of b a1 and b a2. The components determined by b a2 measure positive externalities
9There is no need to specify how the government values the utility of immigrants, as immigrants have
already received education from the other country when they arrive.
12arising from the education provided in the other member state. As these are exogenous from
the perspective of member state 1, the ﬁrst-order condition of domestic policy for member
state 1 is given by
1 − δt+ es − cs =( 1− p)(1 − δt)wb a
TC
1 + αp(1 − t)bwb a
TC
1 +( 1− p)eib a
TC
1 − ci.
On the left-hand side, we have the social surplus from providing education s,d e ﬁned as
ad i ﬀerence between the returns, consisting of after-tax income of the individual, marginal
social external beneﬁt, the marginal eﬀe c to nt h et r a n s f e r ,a n dt h ec o s to fr e s o u r c e sd e v o t e d
to provide education s. On the right-hand side, we have the social surplus from providing




1 − δt+ es − cs + ci
(1 − p)[(1− δt)w + ei]+αp(1 − t)bw
. (4)
Comparative statics yield that investment in education i is increasing in w, ei and cs and
decreasing in ci and es.
Whether public investment in internationally applicable education is larger with or with-
out migration, depends to a large extent on tax rates and on the social valuation of income
accruing to emigrants. If tax rates are very high, then social valuation of the after-tax in-
come of emigrants is low, and governments reduce investment in internationally applicable
education when the probability of migration increases. It also holds:
Proposition 1 Governments with α =0always reduce investment in internationally ap-
13plicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. Note that ∂p/∂γ > 0. Setting α =0 , ∂b aTC
1 /∂p > 0 in (4).
Importantly, an increased mobility of labor need not always reduce total resources used
to ﬁnance education. Whether this is the case or not depends on which type of education
is more expensive. Also when internationally applicable education is less expensive, an
increased probability of migration reduces individual government’s incentives to invest in it.
When government attaches the same weight on emigrants as on citizens staying, in-
creased mobility may lead to either larger or smaller investment in internationally applicable
education. On the one hand, eﬃciency gains from brain exchange for emigrants encourage
governments to invest more in the internationally applicable education. On the other hand,
governments are pushed towards less investment because they lose tax revenue and potential
external beneﬁts from emigrants. An increased probability of emigration may encourage
governments valuing the utility of emigrants highly to increase investment in internationally
applicable education, but this requires that the expatriates earn a higher net wage abroad
than their gross wage and external beneﬁts that they might otherwise generate domestically.
The government would also have to be willing to tax the remaining population to ﬁnance the
utility gains of expatriates. This is not likely if the government has to win approval from the
remaining population. Therefore, it seems more likely that increased labor mobility would
induce the government to change the mix of education provided towards those ﬁelds that
beneﬁt the remaining population, even when the government values the utility of emigrants.
143. Federal Alternatives
3.1. Graduate Taxes
Assume next that emigrants pay graduate taxes to the government which initially ed-
ucated them. The net present value of graduate tax payments depends on future income
ﬂow.10 While there could be an exempted income below which the graduate tax is not col-
lected, this section concentrates on the case in which a graduate tax is an equal share of
income for all educated. The graduate tax rate in both member states is tg. The general
wage tax rate with graduate taxes is tw, so that tw = t − tg. As the aggregate tax rate is
the same as in an economy with tax competition, migration rules derived in section 2.3 still
apply. I also assume that graduate tax revenue is added into and public education ﬁnanced
out of general tax revenue, instead of assuming a separate budget run to ﬁnance education
out of graduate tax revenue. This formulation allows government to still subsidize part of
public education out of general tax revenue. Such subsidies could be used to internalize
complementarity in production between the educated and other factors of production, as in
Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000). They would also alleviate the adverse selection problem
when students are allowed to opt out of graduate taxes and ﬁnance their education directly
themselves.
Pre-migration stock of internationally applicable human capital is given by e H1GT
i =
10Already Friedman and Kuznets (1945) suggested ﬁnancing professional education by students selling
shares in their future earnings.
15R 1
b a1 f(a)ada, and post-migration stock is
H
1GT














+ tg(1 − δ)
h
F(b a1)+( 1− p)w e H
1GT




= G + csF(b a1)+ci(1 − F(b a1)) + T
GT
1 .
There are two diﬀerences compared to equilibrium under tax competition. First of all,
each member state now receives graduate taxes also from emigrants. Secondly, they can levy
only the ordinary wage tax rate tw on immigrants. Citizens still face tax rate t = tw + tg in
both member states. The government of member state 1 maximizes
SWF
GT















1 from the government budget constraint and notice that immigrated




1 − δt+ es − cs + ci
(1 − p)[(1− δt)w + ei]+αp(1 − t)bw + tg(1 − δ)pbw
. (5)
Parallel to Proposition 1, we can prove:
Proposition 2 Governments invest more in internationally applicable education with grad-
uate taxes than under tax competition. Investment in internationally applicable education is
increasing in the graduate tax rate.
Proof. The nominator of (4) and (5) is the same, while the denominator in the latter
o n ee x c e e d st h a ti nt h eﬁrst one by tg(1 − δ)pbw.W h e ntg > 0, b aGT
1 < b aTC
1 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
∂b aGT
1 /∂tg < 0.
Notice that this result is independent of the weight assigned to emigrants. Whether
governments invest more or less in internationally applicable education with graduate taxes
than without migration again depends on the conﬂicting eﬀects: eﬃciency gains of brain
exchange encourages such investments, while the incentives of keeping wage tax revenues as
w e l la sp o t e n t i a le x t e r n a lb e n e ﬁts in the home country discourages them.
A central result is then:
Proposition 3 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving.
Proof. Welfare eﬀects of education policy of either member state can be divided into
internalized eﬀects and externalities on the other member state. By Proposition 2, b aGT
1 < b aTC
1
(and b aGT
2 < b aTC
2 ). By revealed preferences, internalized social welfare has to be at least as
17high with b aGT
1 as member state 1 could still have chosen b aTC
1 but did not, and similarly for
member state 2. As internationally applicable education also creates positive externalities
in the other member state in the form of direct external eﬀects and wage tax revenue from
immigrants, both member states create larger positive externalities on the other member
state, at the same time as they achieve at least as large internalized social welfare.
While I have so far assumed member states to be identical, graduate taxes are actually the
more desirable as opposed to complete harmonization the more member states would diﬀer.
A system with national graduate taxes would respect the subsidiarity principle. Member
states could adopt diﬀerent degrees of public participation in education. Depending on
political preferences, member states could opt for a compulsory graduate tax with wider
income redistribution, or, alternatively, for voluntary contracts in which students would
have to commit to paying a graduate tax in the future in exchange for public ﬁnancing of
education, or opt out and pay their education themselves.
If member states would diﬀer and establishing a graduate tax would require reducing
general wage taxes by a comparable amount, member states would face diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
depending on whether they are net gainers or losers of tax base under tax competition.
Those member states receiving considerable immigration without much emigration might
prefer not to establish graduate taxes, as these would imply, in the form of lower general
wage taxes, losing part of tax revenue that would otherwise be collected from immigrants.
If member states are not very diﬀerent, then it is optimal for both to establish the maximal
graduate tax rate as this maximizes tax revenue from those citizens emigrating to the other
18state, as well as encourages immigration and discourages emigration compared with the
case with only wage taxes. The latter eﬀects follow as a graduate tax collected also from
emigrants renders emigration less attractive, as part of tax burden can no longer be avoided
by emigration. At the same time, it encourages immigration by reducing the tax burden
collected from immigrants. The member state which initially loses more tax base to the
other member state than it receives always ﬁnds it proﬁt a b l et oi n t r o d u c eag r a d u a t et a x ,
even if it would not change its investment in education.
3.2. Income-contingent Loans
A less redistributive alternative to graduate taxes are income-contingent loans. Students
could borrow from their account to ﬁnance both education and living expenses, and this debt
would then accumulate at the market interest rate. The interest rate used could be that
faced by the government debt, in order to induce governments to invest in education in an
eﬃcient manner. Insurance against low incomes could be provided by collecting repayments
only from the income above a certain level until the loan and the interest would be repaid.
If there would be any remaining debt at retirement age, it would be cancelled. In return
for the government absorbing the downside risk, a student would have to pay an insurance
premium. This insurance premium would be added to the debt, and could be a certain
fraction of the balance borrowed. Income-contingent loans would also allow diﬀerentiating
the prices charged for diﬀerent degrees. Financing for expensive degrees oﬀering relatively
low direct monetary returns but judged to be socially valuable, like arts and humanities,
would still call for subsidies from the general tax revenue or cross-subsidies from degrees
19with relatively cheap production costs but high private returns, like law.
While an income-contingent loan system would reduce tax distortions for those earning
enough to pay for their accumulated debt, it need not be a socially better alternative than
graduate taxes. If there is a cap on payments by those with high income, this requires
increasing the contribution rate of those with lower income. Therefore, income-contingent
loans would deliver eﬀectively zero marginal tax rates to ﬁnance education in incentive terms
for those earning suﬃciently to repay their whole education, at a cost of higher eﬀective mar-
ginal tax rates for those with lower income. Evaluating the eﬃciency eﬀects depends then on
the relative size and labor supply elasticities of the aﬀected groups, while welfare evaluation
w o u l da l s oh a v et oa c c o u n tf o ra ne ﬃciency and equity trade-oﬀ. Income-contingent loans
and graduate taxes also diﬀer in the incentive eﬀects for the government. If those emigrating
are expected to have higher income, then graduate taxes encourage a larger investment in
their human capital than income-contingent loans. In the absence of income risks, income-
contingent loans would be accepted only when the required repayment does not exceed the
cost of private loans. In my framework, this would imply replicating educational choices
under private investment in education.
3.3. Calculation for Finland
Finnish government expenditures for universities and student allocations, including hous-
ing allocation, totaled 1.1 billion euros in 2002.11 When evaluating any proposals for a grad-
11Total budget funding for universities was 1.127 billion euros, of which 49.5 percent was allocated to
teaching and most of the remainder to research. This calculation includes only teaching. Student allocations
equaled 324 million euros. All student housing allocation of 220 million euros is included, even though this
20uate tax, at most such an amount would have to be collected from those with university
education. The amount collected could be less in case part of education would be ﬁnanced
out of general tax revenue to reﬂect external beneﬁts to the rest of society. Whatever amount
would be collected from university graduates would allow reducing other tax burdens by the
same amount. If the government would ﬁnance all expenditures on higher education and
student aid from those working-age university graduates who earn more than 24,000 euros
per year and are less than 65 years of age then it would have to collect in average 2,100
euros from each of them.12 To collect such a tax revenue, the graduate tax rate would have
to be 11,7 percent of income above the ﬂoor. If tax cuts would be targeted to all tax payers
earning more than 24,000 euros annually and being less than 65 years old, then their tax
burden could be cut by an amount equal to 7.7 percent of income above 24,000 euros.
In net, a switch to a graduate tax would increase the tax burden of the university gradu-
ates earning more than 24,000 per year by 4.0 percent of their income above this threshold,
while the tax burden of those earning more than 24,000 euros annually without university
education would be decreased by 7.7 percent of the income above this level. While a gradu-
ate tax would increase marginal tax rates faced by those with university education, it would
reduce the wage tax rate aﬀecting migration decisions. As those with university education
and subject to a graduate tax would have to pay the tax independently of their residence,
ﬁgure includes also allocations to students outside universities. (Ministry of Education 2003 and Ministry of
Finance 2003)
12The calculations are based on updated Income Distribution Survey (IDS) at VATT. While the calcula-
tions are only for university education, a graduate tax could be used to ﬁnance also other types of education
given to adults. In that case, tax rates could be diﬀerentiated according to the type of education received.
Calculations are based on gross taxable income.
21such a tax would no longer aﬀect migration decisions. The eﬀects on average incomes are
moderate. The increased costs of presented switch to a graduate tax for university graduates
earning above 24,000 euros annually would be just 1.7 percent of their aggregate income.
Emigration from Finland has increased during the 1990s, varying between 12,000 and
14,000 in 1999, 2000 and 2001. Of Finnish emigrants over the 1990s, about 60 percent
returned within 10 years. (Pirttilä 2003) In 2001, 5.8 percent of Finnish working-age doctors
and 5.0 percent of nurses lived abroad. (Vaalgamaa and Ohtonen 2002) Emigrants tend to
be those with the most recently completed education. Of the 1,038 members of the Union
of Health Professionals who emigrated in 2001, 150 had completed education in 2000 or
2001. The share of the members of the Finnish Association of Graduates in Economics and
Business Administration (SEFE) living abroad is 4 percent. (Oksanen 2002) While there is
no research about ﬁscal eﬀects of migration for Finland, it is reasonable to expect the eﬀects
for Finland would not diﬀer much from those for Denmark. Andersen (2002) has calculated
the ﬁscal eﬀects of emigration for Denmark. The results depend crucially on who migrate.
If public expenditures are reduced in ratio to migration, then the net loss of one percent of
Danish GDP would require an emigration of more than 13,500 30-year-olds.13 However, if
emigration is concentrated to those with higher education, then its consequences are more
drastic. A permanent emigration of 1,900 30-year-olds with higher education would result
in the net loss of one percent of GDP to the public sector.
13Future tax revenues are discounted using a two percent interest rate, and then compared with the Danish
GDP in the year 2001.
224. Discussion
4.1. Adverse Selection and Taming Leviathan
With benevolent governments that I have analyzed so far, there would be no eﬃciency jus-
tiﬁcation for a system of voluntary risk-sharing contracts between students and governments
as opposed to compulsory system of graduate taxes, collected independently of domicile.
With voluntary contracts, a problem of adverse selection arises. Sinn (1997) shows that a
voluntary insurance system may completely break down in the presence of private informa-
tion due to adverse selection. Therefore, avoiding a break-down of voluntary risk-sharing
contracts could then require a partial subsidy from the general tax revenue to those who
participate.14 Most likely those with highest expected income would still ﬁnd it optimal to
purchase their education privately. Nonetheless, opting for voluntary contracts on graduate
taxes is still likely to be an optimal constitutional arrangement in a federation, as opposed
to binding nationality-based taxation. In a world where benevolence of governments is not
universally guaranteed, constitutional design has to trade-oﬀ adverse selection problem and
the need to tame Leviathan governments. A voluntary system would maintain some degree
of tax competition, viewed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) as an essential mechanism
through which a federal structure protects citizens against excessive taxation by lower-level
governments. Accepting a certain degree of adverse selection would then be optimal, and
could be interpreted as a federation’s insurance premium against potential abuses by gov-
14Nerlove (1975) analyzes problems associated with ﬁnancing higher education using income-contingent
loans. Focusing on Yale Tuition Postponement Option, implemented in early 70s, he shows that the conse-
quences of income-contingent loans depended crucially on who participated.
23ernments.
Voluntary graduate tax contracts could be combined with both privately and publicly
provided education, as they could be constructed so that the government would provide
students with a voucher and a student aid scheme in exchange for signing the contract.
Furthermore, governments could oﬀer graduate tax contracts also for nationals from other
EU member states. This would solve also the problem of free-riding by mobile students
when public education is tax-ﬁnanced, highlighted recently by Del Rey (2001). Voluntary
graduate tax contracts or income-contingent loans would favor the emergence of a genuine
European market for higher education, establishing proper incentives for member states to
provide education also for students from other member states.
4.2. EU Enlargement and Graduate Tax - A Triple Dividend?
The gap in living standards between the current EU states and the applicant countries
has generated fear that migration would put current welfare systems under severe pressure.
However, there are several reasons to expect that the eﬀects of migration, if widespread, could
be much more severe at the origin of migration ﬂows. It is plausible that a disproportionate
share of emigrants would be those who are young and talented. A haunting possibility is that
prospective new member states could react to the perceived threat of brain drain by investing
too little in the human capital of prospective emigrants, especially by underinvesting in
their language skills. Increased labor mobility would then lead into eroded provision of
internationally applicable education, like the natural sciences, engineering, medicine, and
economics, and bias the curriculum oﬀered towards internationally less applicable ﬁelds, like
24law and humanities with national emphasis.
The introduction of graduate taxes in the new member states could oﬀer a triple dividend,
beneﬁting the emigrants, those left behind in the new member states and the old member
states alike. By giving the country of origin a stake also in productivity gains created by
emigrants elsewhere, a system of graduate taxes would encourage new member states to
invest more eﬃciently also in internationally applicable human capital. Emigrants would
beneﬁt by receiving a better and more suitable education, enhancing their chances in the old
member states in which their productivity could be several times higher. Those left behind
could reap returns on human capital investment in the form of graduate tax payments from
well-educated emigrants. Finally, the old member states would beneﬁt by receiving better
educated immigrants. There are also two additional eﬃciency-improving mechanisms that
are not captured by my model. First of all, an increased investment in internationally
applicable education would allow new member states to beneﬁt more extensively from brain
exchange when part of emigrants return. With more eﬃcient human capital investments,
those returning would be even more productive. By transferring resources to the new member
states, graduate tax payments could also reduce the need for other transfers.
4.3. Administrative Issues and Synergies
The implementation of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans requires that all mem-
b e rs t a t e so ft h ef e d e r a t i o nc o l l e c tt a xr e v e n u eo rl o a nr e p a y m e n ta l s of o rt h eo t h e rm e m b e r
states. This would call for a creation of a European tax payer identity number, as well as
exchanging information between member states. A European tax payer identiﬁcation num-
25ber could be constructed from existing national social security numbers by adding a country
code in front of them, and deciding that the social security number received at birth with
its initial country code would serve as the European tax payer identiﬁcation number also
in case of changing nationality. Alternatively, immigrants from another member state could
still receive a new social security number in their new country of residence, with obligations
from the previous country being automatically transferred to the new account.
Compared to the status quo with tax competition, a system of graduate taxes or income-
contingent loans could produce winners and losers when member states diﬀer. Introducing
such a system might then require that member states gaining from such a new arrangement
would compensate those losing. Due to overall eﬃciency gains, such a compensation scheme
should be feasible. Implementing transfers between member states would suﬀer from the
incentives of individual member states to avoid fulﬁlling their obligations, but these same
problems are already present in implementing agricultural and regional policy. To deter
cheating by member states, the European Union could implement a system in which mem-
ber states caught cheating would face heavy ﬁnes, and individual civil servants exposing
malpractice by their governments would receive immunity of prosecution related to exposing
such oﬀences, as well as a ﬁnancial reward for exposing those. Such a reward could be a
fraction of penalties imposed on the government caught violating rules, with a ceiling at, say,
one to ten million euros, depending on the type of violation exposed. This same incentive
scheme could be used to deter and detect malpractices in other programs, as well as inside
EU administration.
26Introducing a European tax payer identiﬁcation number would oﬀer synergies with es-
tablishing portable pensions across EU member states, as well as in limiting tax evasion. If
pension rules penalize changing a ﬁrm or state, then they impose implicit barriers to the
free mobility of labor. The subsidiarity principle and free mobility could be combined by
requiring that pension beneﬁts would be accumulated in each member state as a separate
incremental entitlement for each year or month. These entitlements to future pensions would
then be recorded using European tax payer identiﬁc a t i o nn u m b e r sw i t ha na n n u a lb a s i s ,i n -
cluding information on when and under what conditions the beneﬁt can be claimed. The
same European tax payer identiﬁcation number could also be used to exchange informa-
tion on labor and capital income earned in diﬀerent member states, thereby limiting the
possibilities for tax evasion.
5. Conclusion
The European model of social protection is under severe pressure. The member states
of the European Union face incentives to cut welfare beneﬁts and wage taxes in order to
deter poor migrants and attract those with high incomes. Member states may free-ride by
attracting skilled migrants with low taxes instead of paying for expensive education. This
renders the ﬁnancing of internationally applicable education less attractive for individual
member states. In this paper, I suggest introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent
loans, paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile. Giving member
states a stake in eﬃciency gains also earned elsewhere would encourage governments to invest
more in human capital beneﬁting also the other member states. A system of graduate taxes or
27income-contingent loans should be based on voluntary contracts, in order to protect citizens
against the possibility of excessive taxation by rent-seeking governments. Even though some
students would opt out, this would not threaten the system. By paying their own education,
those opting out would not impose any burden on those signing the contract. Voluntary
contracts would also enjoy a greater legitimacy than subjecting citizens, even in case of
permanent emigration, to an inescapable tax burden on the basis of where they were born.
Implementing either graduate taxes or income-contingent loans would call for a European
tax payer identiﬁcation number, which could also be used to limit tax evasion.
Graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be a part of a wider reform to combine
in appearance conﬂicting aims of free mobility, the subsidiarity principle, the maintenance of
social protection and a reduction of tax burden. Richter (2002) and Sinn (2003) argue in favor
of the delayed integration, in which migrants would be transferred from one redistribution
system to another after a period of transition. Fölster (1997) and Sørensen (2003) suggest
that part of individual’s wage or social security taxes would be replaced by a mandatory
social insurance contribution added to his or her mandatory individual savings account, used
then to ﬁnance beneﬁts smoothing consumption before retirement. These insights could
be combined by making the balance of individual savings accounts transferable between
countries. During the transition period, beneﬁts and payments would be made according to
the rules of the country of origin. After the transition period, the remaining balance would
be transferred into the new system. Even with such a principle of delayed integration with
individual accounts, it would seem optimal to have a separate account for education. While
28a general account would be used to ﬁnance consumption smoothing over lifetime, an income-
contingent loan to ﬁnance education or a graduate tax contract would rather resemble a joint
venture between a student and a government providing for public education.
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